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Re-thinking Thought

Francis Wybrands

Review-essay on Critique,January-February 1985, no. 452-453: ItalianPhilosophers
by Themselves (221 pages). Paris, Editions de Minuit.

To the question raised by Eugenio Garin of knowing whether
we must recognize the existence of an Italian philosophy-a
question of historical interest, perhaps, but philosophically of little
relevance (would it then be legitimate to speak of a Spanish
mathematics, a Swiss biology or a Canadian philosophy?)-it
would be better to respond by asking instead in which ways the
philosophical heritage which has been passed down to us since
Parmenides is being taken up and worked on in Italy today. That is,
how are the questions which have constituted, and still constitute,
philosophy being reinvented in Italy today?
(Perhaps the very notion of dividing up "the country of
philosophy" according to geographic regions results from the fact
that our epoch, as the epoch of communication, lives under the
constraint of having to pass and circulate thought as "cultural
merchandise." So if it is right to applaud this enterprise of making
known in France what is going on at her doorstep, then it is proper
to note that the very realization of such a project throws a merciless
[Trans. from the French by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas]
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light not only on the miserable state of translation in France, but
also, and most important, on the discrepancy, which has become
more and more obvious, between thought and the means which it
has to make itself heard. It is, perhaps, against this antipathy
which our epoch has toward thought that the essays collected in
this volume, better than many others, bear witness.)
"Since the beginning of the twentieth century the general
meaning of the world can no longer be read in the book of the
philosophers." This statement by A. dal Lago sets the tone for a
philosophy which no longer has illusions about itself and which
attempts to respond to a disillusioned world by redefining the
tasks of thinking. Thus the notion of "weak thought" -illustrated
here by philosophers such as P.A. Rovatti, A . Gargani and especially G . Vattimo-and
"sobered thought" [degrisee],a rationality
exorcised of its own powers and inspired by thinkers such as
Nietzsche, Heidegger (with Husserl and Gadamer) and Wittgenstein.
The line of separation between being and nothingness is no
longer stable; the solidarity between "thinking and that which is
thought" (P. A. Rovatti), between the one who thinks and that
which is thought, has collapsed, leaving behind a shattered unity,
a state of crisis for "strong thought" (that which concerns itself
only with the specular reconciliation of man and the world in the
name of a unifying principle). It is this crisis which, beyond knowledge, allows the questionof meaning [questiondu sense] to appear in
all its nakedness and fragility. What remains is a rupture between
the structures of our thought-structures
meant to equate the
truth of adequate propositions to that which is-and the world,
which, more than ever, is at the mercy of domination and, more
than ever, finds itself sent back to its unsuspected opacity.
To counter the common false interpretations of Heideggerthat is, Heidegger's thought read as ontology, as the nostalgic
return to a green, pre-Socratic paradise, as negative theology, or as
historicism and irrationalism . .. -it is salutary to read G. Vattimo's text, which attempts to read the work of the thinker in its
entirety, taking as its starting point Heidegger's most scandalous
affirmations in order to discover in them the traces of a '' thinking of
the decline" [pensierodel declino].That there is nothing left of being
means, among other things, that nihilism is "the only possible path
for ontology ." Being is to be understood neither as a stable and
fixed term, nor as an ultimate foundation: it "is not one of the poles
of oscillation . . . it is the domain of the oscillation itself." Neither
pure luminosity nor foundational force, being is inseparable from
both its decline and its declension. Its "contingent character" is not
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one of its attributes but its very essence. "We are beings [etants]
only insofar as we are ventured [risques] into and through the
venture of being" (Heidegger). Being ventures itself to us: it is only
as this venture, this risk; and we are only insofar as we confront
this venture. Risk, venture, putting into play-these
are ways of
expressing the contingent character of that which Heidegger
called, in terms which are still provisional, "the ontological difference." Thus the being to which we are related by the modes of
impermanence and mortality is both uncertain and transitory, both
temporal and provisional. There is no shared foundation, therefore, but a common destiny or decline. The essential finitude of this
play shapes, at each moment, new configurations whereby life and
death invent themselves. Far from justifying, in the manner of the
philosophies of history, that which is in the name of a transcendent
principle [arche or telos], the non-reconciling thought of Heidegger
(similar in this way to the thought of Adorno) would arrive all at
once at an aesthetics or an ethics, a style of life and of thought which
can be summed up in the notion of piety. Piety is not to be understood as "attention and respect," as "rememoration"-which
is
not mere recollection of that which once was, but memory of the
uncertain traces left by the singular and unique experiences of
man. "Not to overlook anything, not to let oneself be carried away.
And at the same to be suspicious of immobility, of one's own
reflection in the mirror, of the narcissistic seizure of the void" (P.A.
Rovatti).
In the margins of this mode of thought, R. Bodei devotes
himself to a rigorous reading of dialectical thought-of its past, its
present crisis, and its possible meaning. What, in fact, Bodei asks,
could replace the dialectic which acted as "a strategy for individuation," "as a constructive procedure, an enrichment and socialization of individuality"? If the present crisis of this "metaphysics of
development," this "partisan thinking of civilization," is positive,
in that it allows us to denounce all the theological presuppositions
on which this thinking was established, must it necessarily entail
the withdrawal of the individual into his own emptiness? The
individual quest for salvation, together with the corresponding
loss of that which founded metaphysical subjectivity, appears as a
flight into "a religion or a metaphysics which cannot be relied upon
to fill an interior void" (echoing Spengler's diagnosis). To counteract this state of affairs and the division of discourses into "a logic
of force" and "a powerless and consoling rationality," it would be
necessary to opt for a "weak," sobered dialectic, which is apt to
translate "contradictions into opportunities for change."
Besides two essays by M. Vegetti and B. de Giovanni which
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reexamine, in an historically oriented fashion, one the notion of
classicism (in the light of stoicism) and the other the thought of
Vico (who, as the thinker of the origin and of its oblivion on behalf
of the useful, proves to be an important link for understanding "all
civilization of the twentieth century"), it is necessary to mention
two quite different, though both unclassifiable, texts : one by G .
Agamben and the other by E. Severino. The first is a meditation on
"the concept of language": "Is there a possible discourse which,
without being a metalanguage and without falling into the unsayable, says language while exposing its limits . . . ?" The task of
philosophy today is to confront this question which theology,
ontology and psychology can no longer answer. To see language
itself-that is, language as "immediate mediation" - could send
us beyond all presuppositions to the "ahypothetical beginning" of
which Plato speaks in the Republic. Weakening and enfeebling of
the philosophical question, which, in this way, sees itself taken
back to its essential and original poverty- such would be the path
of a thinking in quest of the blind task which allows all vision, all
speech, and is the foundation of all community.
The second text, the one by E. Severino, presents itself as an
original meditation which attempts to go back beyond "the original
separation between being and beings as the essence of time"
toward the eternal unity of which Parmenides, "the most misunderstood thinker in the history of man," would have had a presentiment. The original separation of being and beings, of being and
appearance, is the origin of alienation and nihilism (a true "fall in
time") that thinkers such as Hegel, Heidegger or Habermas, along
with all quests for salvation, only strengthen, thereby participating
in the will of technical domination.
From R. Pineri's useful historical account of Italian
philosophers between 1940 and 1960, a work which recalls the
great figures (B. Croce, N. Abbagnano, A. Banfi, E. Paci, L.
Pareyson, P. Chiodi ... ), one must remember the tremendous
labor and concern for dialogue displayed by these thinkers which
allowed German Idealism as well as the phenomenology of Husserl and the investigations of Heidegger to go on living.
To conclude it is necessary to mention two particular
phenomena pointed out by documentary articles. The first is
the fecundity and longevity of the Marxist tradition (retraced by
A. Tosel) which, from A. Labriola in the last century to P. Togliatti,
A. Gramsci, L. Coletti and A. Negri, bears witness to a current of
thought which, without giving up its practical concerns, retains its
demand for critical thought. The second phenomenon (recounted
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by R. Dadoun) is this curious "School of Lecce" which, though less
famous than the Frankfurt School, shows that there is no
privileged place for giving oneself to serious philosophical reflection.
If one had to draw a lesson from this volume, it would be that
freedom of thought is not that which is given reluctantly by the
powers that be, but that which is opened up by the works of those
who dare to invent it.
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